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ABSTRACT 
In cooperative man-machine interaction, it is necessary but not sujjicimt for a system to respond 
truthfully and informatively to  a user's question. In particular, if the system has reason t o  believe that its 
planned response might mislead the user, then it must block that conclusion by modifying its response. 
This paper focusses on identifying and avoiding potentially misleading responses by acknowledging types 
of 'informing behavior' usually expected of an expert. We attempt to  give a formal account of aeveral 
types of assertions that should be included in response to  questions concerning the achievement of some 
goal (in addition to the simple answer), lest the questioner otherwise be misled. 
1. Introduction] 
In cooperat.ive man-machine interaction, it is necessary but not aujjicient for a system to  respond 
truthfully and informatively to a user's question. In particular, if the system has reason to  believe that its 
planned response might mislead the user to draw a false conclusion, then it must block that conclusion by 
modifying or adding to its response. 
Such cooperat,ive behavior was investligated in (51, in which a modification of Grice's Maxim o j  Quality 
- 'Be truthful' - is proposed: 
If you, the speaker, plan to  say anything which may imply for the hearer something that you 
believe to be false, then provide further information to  block it. 
This behavior was studied in the context of interpreting certain definite noun phrases. In this paper, we 
investigate this revised principle as applied to responding to asem' plan-related questions. Our overall aim 
is to: 
1. characterize tractable cases in which the system as respondent (R) can anticipate the 
possibility of the user/questioner (Q) drawing false conclusions from its response and hence 
alter it so as to  prevent this happening; 
2. develop a formal method for computing the projected inferences that Q may draw from a 
l ~ h i s  work is partially supported by NSF Grants MCS 81-07290, MCS 88-05221, and IST 88-11400. 
2 ~ t  present visiting the Department of Computer m d  Information Science, University of Pennsylvania PA 10104. 
particular response, identifying those factors whose presence or absence catalyzes the 
inferences; 
3. enable the system to  generate modifications 01 its response that can defuse possible false 
inferences and that  may provide additional useful information as well. 
In responding to any question, including those related to plans, a respondent (R) must conform to 
Grice's first Mazim of Quantity as well as the revised Mazim o j  Quality stated above: 
Make your contribution as informative as ia required (lor the current purposes of the 
exchange). 
At best, if R's response is not so informative, it may be seen as uncooperative. At worst, it may end up 
violating the revised Mazim of Quality, causing Q to conclude something R either believes to  be lalse or 
does not know to  be true: the consequences could be dreadful. Our task is to  characterize more precisely 
what this expected informativeness consists of. In question answering, there seem to  be several quite 
different types of information, over and beyond the simple answer t o  a question, that  are nevertheless 
expected. For example, 
1. When a task-related question is posed to an expert (R), R is expected to  provide additional 
information that he recognizes as necessary to  the performance of the task, of which the 
questioner (Q) may be unaware. Such response behavior was discussed and implemented by 
Allen (11 in a system to  simulate a train information booth attendant responding to  requests 
for schedule and track information. In this case, not providing the expected additional 
information is simply uncooperative: Q won't conclude the train doesn't depart a t  any time if 
?? fails to  volunteer one. 
2 ,  1) ( t : ~  r~spec t  o discussions and/or arguments, a speaker contradicting another is expected to  
supp~a t  his contrary contention. Again, failing to  provide support would simply be viewed as 
unc:)operative (2, 31. 
3. With respect to an expert's responses to questions, if Q expects that R would inform him of P 
if P were true, then Q may interpret R's silence regarding P as implying P is not true.3 Thus if 
13 knows P to  be true, his silence may lead to Q's being misled. This third type of expected 
informativeness is the basis for the potentially misleading responses that we are trying to 
avoid and that constitute the subject of this paper. 
What is of interest to  us is charact~rizing the Ps that Q would expect an expert R to  inform him of, if 
they hold. Notice that these Ps differ from script-based expectations [8],  which are based on what is 
taken to be the ordinary course of events in a situation. In describing such a situation, if the speaker 
dI)esnpt explicit.ly reference some element P of the script, the listener simply assumes it is true. On the 
other hand, t,he Ps  of interest here are based on normal cooperative discourse behavior, as set out in 
Grice '~ maxims. If the speaker doesn't make explicit some information P that the listener believes he 
would possess and inform the listener of, the listener assumes i t  is false. 
In this paper, we attempt to give a formal account of a sm5class of Ps  that should be included (in 
addition to the simple answer) in response to questions involving Q's achieving some goal4 - e.g., .Can I 
3 ~ h i s  is m interactional version of what Reiter 1131 has called the mClosed World Assumptionm and what MeCarthy [Q] has 
discussed in the context of mCircumscription~. 
4~ companion paper [6] discusses responses which may mis1e.d Q into assuming some default which R knows not to hold. 
Related work [I] discusses providing indirect or modified responses to yes/no questions where a direct response, while 
truthful, might mislead Q. 
drop CIS577?', -1 want to enrol in CIS577?", 'Now do I get t o  Marsh Creek on the Expre~sway?~,  etc., 
lest that response otherwise mislead Q. In this endeavor, our first step is to specify that knowledge that an 
expert R must have in order to identify the Ps  that Q would expect to  be informed of, in response to  his 
question. Our second step b to  formalize that knowledge and show how the system can use it. Our third 
step is to show how the system can modify its planned response so as to  convey those Ps. In this paper, 
Section 2 addresses the first step of this process and Sections 3 and 4 address the second. The third step 
we mention here only in passing. 
2. Factors in Computing Likely Informing Behavior] 
Before discussing the factors involved in computing this desired system behavior, we want to  call 
attention to  the distinction we are drawing between adions and events, and between the atated goal of a 
question and its intended goal. We limit the term action to things that Q bas some control over. Things 
beyond Q's control we will call eventa, even if performed by other agents. While events may be likely or 
even necessary, Q and R nevertheless can do nothing more than wait for them to happen. This distinction 
between actions and events shows up in R's response behavior: if an action is needed, R can suggest that 
Q perform it. If an event is, R can do no more than inform Q. 
Our second distinction is between the atated goal or =S-goalm of a request and its intended goal or 
#I-goalw. The former k the goal most directly associated with Q's request, beyond that Q bnow the 
information. That is, we take the S-goal of a request to  be the goal directly achieved by using the 
information. 
Underlying the stated goal of a request though may be another goal that the speaker wants to  achieve. 
This intended goal or 'I-goa?" may be related to the S-goal of the request in any of a number of ways: 
e The I-goal may be the pame as the S-goal. 
a The I-goal may be more abstract than the S-goal, which addresses only part of the I-goal. 
(This is the standard goal/sub-goal relation found in hierarchical planning (141.) For exampie, 
Q's S-goal may be to  delete some files (e.g., 'How can I delete all but the last version of 
FOO.MSS?#), while his I-goal may be to bring his file usage under quota. This more abstract 
goal may also involve archiving some other files, moving some into another person's directory, 
etc. 
The S-goai may be an enaFAing condition for the I-goal. For example, Q's S-goal may be to  get 
read/write access to a file, while his I-goal may be to  alter it. 
The I-goal may be more general than the S-goal. For example, Q's S-goal may be to know how 
to  repeat a controEN, while his I-goal may be to  know how to effect multiple sequential 
instances of a control character. 
a Conversely, the Egoel may be more specific than the S-goal - for example, Q's S-goal may be 
t o  know how to  send fiks to  someone on another machine, while his I-goal is just to  send a 
particular file to  a local network user, which may dlow for a specialized procedure. 
Inferring the 1-goal corresponding to  an S-goal is an active area of research 11, Carberry83, 10, 111. We 
assume for the purposes of this paper that R can successfully do so. One problem is that the relationship 
that Q believes to  hold between his S-goal and his I-goal may not actually hold: for example, the S-goal 
may not fulfill part of the 1-goal, or it may not instantiate it, or it may not be a pre-condition for it. In 
fact, the Sgoal  may not even be possible to  effect! This failure, under the rubric 'relaxing the 
appropriate-query assumption', is discussed in more detail in [lo, 111. It is also reason for augmenting R's 
response with appropriate Ps, as we note informally in this section and more formally in the next. 
Having drawn these distinctions, we now claim that in order for the system to  compute both a direct 
answer to  Q's request and such P s  as he would expect to  be informed of, were they true, the system must 
be able to  draw upon knowledge/beliefs about 
the events or actions, if any, that can bring about a goal 
their enabling conditions 
the likelihood of an event occuring or the enabling conditions for an action holding, with 
respect t o  a state 
ways of evaluating methods of achieving goals - for example, with respect to simplicity, other 
consequences (side effects), likelihood of success, etc. 
general characteristics of cooperative expert behavior 
The roles played by these different types d knowledge (as well as specific examples of them) are well 
illustrated in the next section. 
3. Formali~ing Knowledge for Expert Response 
In this section we give examples of how a formal model of user beliefs about cooperative expert behavior 
can be used to  avoid misleading responses to  task-related questions - in particular, what is a very 
representative set of questions, those of the form 'How do I do X?'. Although we use logic for the model 
because it is clear and precise, we are not proposing theorem proving as the means of computing 
cooperative behavior. In Section 4 we suggest a computational mechanism. The examples are from a 
domain of advising students and involve responding to  the request .I want to drop CIS577'. The set of 
individuals includes not only students, instructors, courses, etc. but also states. Since events and actions 
change states, we represent them as (possibly parameterized) functions from states t o  states. All terms 











the current state of the student 
R believes proposition P 
R believes that  Q believes P 
eventlaction e can apply in state S 
a is a likely eventfaction in state S 
P ,  a proposition, is true in S 
x wants P to be true 
T o  encode the preconditions and consequences of performing an action, we adopt an axiomatiaation of 
STRIPS operators due to  [Chestez83, 7, 15). The preconditions on an action being applicable are encoded 
using .holdsm and .drnissiblea (essentially defining .admissiblem). Namely, if c l ,  ..., cn are preconditions 
on an action a ,  
holds(c1,s) &...& holds(cn,s) =+ admissible(a(s)) 
a's immediate consequences p l ,  ..., pm can be stated as 
admissible(a(s)) =+ holds(p1, a(s)) & ... t holdsfpm, a(s)) 
A frame axiom states that only p l ,  ..., pm have changed. 
-(p=pl) & ... & -.(p=pm) & holds(p,s)3 & admissible(a(s)) =+ holds,a(s)) 
In particular, we can state the preconditions and consequences of dropping CIS577. (h and n are 
variables, while C stands for CIS577.) 
RB(holds(enrolled(h, C, fall), n) & holds(date(n)<Nov16, n) 
=+ admissible(drop(h,CAn))) 
RB(~(p=enrolled(h,C,fall)) & admissible(drop@,CAn)) & holds(p,n) 
=+ holds(p,drop(h,C#n))) 
Of course, this only partially solves the frame problem, since there will be implications of p l ,  ..., pm in 
general. For instance, it is likely that one might have an axiom stating that one receives a grade in a 
course only if the individual is enrolled in the course. 
Q's S-goal in dropping CIS577 is not being in the course. By a process of reasoning discussed in (10, 111, 
R may conclude that Q's likely intended goal (I-goal) is not failing it. That is, R may believe: 
RBQB(holds(-fail(Q,C), drop(Q,ClScj))5 
RB(want(Q,-.fail(Q,C)) ) 
What we claim is: (1) R must give a truthful response addressing a t  least Q's S-goal; (2) in addition, R 
may have to provide information in order not to mislead Q; and (3) R may give additional information to 
be cooperative in other ways. In the subsections below, we enumerate the cases that R must check in 
effecting (2). In each case, we give both a formal representation of the additional information to be 
conveyed and a possible English gloss. In that gloss, the part addressing Q's S-goal will appear in normal 
type, while the additional information will be underlined. 
For each case, we give two formulae: a statement of R's beliefs about the current situation and an 
axiom stating R's beliefs about Q's expectations. Formulae of the first type have the form RB(P). 
Formulae of the second type relate such beliefs to performing an informing action. They involve a 
statement of the form 
RE[P] =+ likely(i, Sc), 
where i is an informing act. For example, if R believes there is a better way to achieve Q's goal, R is 
likely to inform Q of that better way. Since it is assumed that Q has this belief, we have 
QB( RB[P] * likely(i, Sc) ). 
slt will also be the cure that RBQB(sdrnissible(drop(Q,C~Sc))) if Q's asks mWow can I drop CIS577fm, but not if he rsks 
.Can I drop CIS577fm. In the latter ease, Q must of course believe that it be admissible, or why ask the question. ?n 
either case, R's subsequent behavior doesn't seem contingent on his beliefs about beliefs about admissibility. 
where we can equate 'Q believes i is likely' with 'Q expects i.' Since R has no direct access to  Q's 
beliefs, this must be embedded in R's model of Q's belief space. Therefore, the axioms have the form 
(modulo quantifier placement) 
RBQB( RB[Pj + likely(i, Sc) ). 
An informing act is meant to  serve as a command t o  a natural language generator which selecb 
appropriate lexical items, phrasing, etc. for a natural language utterance. Such an act has the form 
inform-that(R,Q,P) R informs Q that P is true. 
3.1. Failure of enabling comdl.i;ions 
Suppose that it is past the November 15th deadline or that the official records don't show Q enrolled in 
CIS577. Then the enabling conditions for dropping it are not met. That is, R believes Q's Sgoal  cannot be 
achieved from Sc. 
(11 RB(want(Q,-.fail(Q,C)) & -admissible(drop(Q,Cfic))) 
Thus R initially plans to answer 'You can't drop CIS577'. Beyond this, there are two possibilities. 
3.1.1. A way 
If R knows another action b that would achieve Q's goals (cf. formula 121)' Q would expect to  be 
informed about it. If not so informed, Q may mistakenly conclude that there is no other way. Formula 
131 states this belief that R has about Q's expectations. 
(21 RB((3b) ladmissiblc(b(Sc)) & holds(-d'ail(Q,C), b(Sc))]) 
R's full response is therefore "You can't drop 577; you can b.' For instance, b could be changing status to 
auditor, which may be performed until December 1. 
8.1.2. No wny 
If R doesn't know of any adion or event that could achieve Q's goal (cf. 141)' Q would expect to be so 
informed. Formula 1.51 states this belief about Q's expectations. 
141 RB(-.(3a)[admissible(a(Sc)) & holds(-.fail(Q,C),a(Sc))]) 
To  say only that Q cannot drop the course does not exhibit expert cooperative behavior, since Q would be 
uncertain as to  whether R had considered other alternatives. Therefore, R's full response is 'You can't 
drop 577; there iaa 2 anything you can do to prevent jailing.' 
Notice that R's analysis of the situation may turn up additiooal informaticjn which a cooperative expert 
could provide that does not involve avoiding misleading Q. For instance, R could indicate enabling 
conditions that prevent there being a solution: suppose the request t o  drop the course is made after the 
November 15th deadline. Then R would believe the following, in addition to (11 
RB(holds(enrolled(Q,C,fall),Sc) & holds(date(Sc)>Novl5,Sc)) 
More generally, we need a schema such as the following about Q'B beliefs: 
In this case the response should be *You can't drop 577; Pi i8nY true.' Alternatively, the language 
generator might paraphrase the whole response as, *if Pi were true, you could drop.' 
Of course there are potentially many ways to try to achieve a goal: by a single action, by a single 
event, or by an event and an action, ... In fact, the search for a sequence of events or actions that would 
achieve the goal may consider many alternatives. If all fail, it is far from obvious which blocked condition 
to notify Q of, and knowledge is needed to guide the choice. Some heuristics for dealing with that problem 
a;, give11 in 1121. 
3.2. An nonp~oductive set 
Suppose the proposed action does not achieve Q's 1-goal, cf. 161. For example, dropping the course may 
still mean that failing status would be recorded as a WF (withdrawal while failing). R may initially plan to 
answer *You can drop 577 by ...*. However, Q would expect t o  be told tbat his proposed action does not 
achieve his I-goal. Formula [7] states R's belief about this expectation. 
[6] RB(-holds(-fail(Q,C), drop(Q,CASc)) 62 admissible(drop(Q,C#c)) ) 
[7] RBQB(RB[ want(Q,-.fail(Q,C)) & -holds(-fail(Q,C),drop(Q,CASc)) 
& admissible(drop(Q,C~Sc))] 
* likely (inJorm-that [R,Q, 
-. holds(-. jail(Q,C), drop(Q,C)(Sc))),Sc)) 
R's full response is, *You can drop 577 by .... However, you will atill jail.* Furthermore, given the 
reasoning in sect.ion 3.1.1 above, R's full response would also inform Q if there is an action b tbat the user 
can take instead. 
8.8. A better way 
Suppose R believes that there is a better way to achieve Q's I-goal, cf. [8] - for example, taking an 
incomplete to have additional time to perform the work, and thereby not losing all the effort Q has 
already expended. Q would expect that R, as a cooperative expert, would inform him of such a better 
way, cf. 191. If R doesn't, R risks misleading Q that there isn't one. 
[9] RBQB(RB[want(Q,-fail(Q,C)) & 
RB[(3b)[holds(-.fail(Q,C \ , b(Sc)) & admissible(b(Sc)) & 
better(b,drop(Q,C)(ScJ 
=+ likely (in j m - t h a t  (R,Q, 
(3b)/?tolds(-fail(Q,C),b[Sc)) El admiaaiblefi[Sc)) d 
bett er(b,dro~(Q,C)(sc)))) Sc)] ) 
R's direct response is to indicate how j can be done. R's full response includes, in addition, 'b is a better 
way.' 
Notice that if R doesn't explicitly tell Q that he is presenting a better way (i.e., he just presents the 
method), Q may be misled that the response addresses his S-goal: i.e., he may falsely conclude that he is 
being told how to  drop the course. (The possibility shows up clearer in other examples - e.g., if R omits 
the first sentence of the response below 
Q: How do I get to Marsh Creek on the Expressway? 
R: It's faster and shorter to  take Route 30. Go out 
Lancaster Ave until .... 
Thus even when adhering to  expert response behavior in terms of addressing an I-goal, we must keep the 
system aware of potentially misleading aspects of its modified response as well. 
Note that R may believe that Q expects to  be told the best way. This would change the second axiom to 
include within the scope of the existential quantifier 
(Va){~(a=b) =+ [holds(-.fail(Q,C), a@)) & admissible(a(Sc)) & better(b,a)]) 
3.4. The only w a y  
Suppose there is nothing inconsistent about what the user has proposed - i.e., all preconditions are met 
and it will achieve the user's goal. R's direct response would simply be to tell Q how. However, if R 
notices that that is the only way to achieve the goal (cf. [lo]), it could optionally notify Q of that, cf. 1111. 
(101 RB((3!a)(hold~(-.fail(Q~C)~a(Sc)) & admissible(a(Sc)) & a=drop(Q,C)(ScJ) 
11 11 RBQB(RB(want(Q,-fail Q,C))) 
& RB((3!a)[holds I -.fail(Q,C), a(Sc)) & admissible(a(Sc)) & a=drop(Q,C)(ScJ) 
=+ likely(in form-that(R, Q, 
Sc)) 
R's full response is 'You can drop 577 by .... That is the only way to  prevent failing.. 
3.5. Someth ing  T u r n i n g  Up 
Suppose there is no appropriate action that Q can take t o  achieve his I-goal. That is, 
RB( -.(3 a)[admissible(a(Sc)) & holds(g, ~(SC))])  
There may still be some event e out of Q's control that could bring about the intended goal. This gives 
several more cases of R's modifying his response. 
8.6.1. Unlikely event 
If e is unlikely to  occur (cf. [12]), Q would expect R to  inform him of e, while noting its implausibiiity, cf. 
1131 
(121 RB((3e)[admissible(e(Sc)) & holds(-faiI(Q,C), 4%)) 
& -.likely(e, Sc)]) 
(13) 
4 likely (in form-that(R, 9, 
8 holds(- fail(Q,C), e(Sc)) 
Thus R's full response is, 'You can't drop 577. If e occurs, you will not fail  577, but e is unlikely.' 
3.5.2. Likely event 
If the event e is likely (cf. [14]), it does not seem necessary to  state it, but it is certainly safe to  do so. A 
formula representing this case follows. 
R's beliefs about Q's expectations are the same as the previous case except that likely(e, Sc) replaces 
-.likely(e, Sc). Thus R's full responcse may be 'You can't drop 577. However, e ia likely to occur, in which 
cnze you will not fail  577.' 
3.6.3. Event followed b y  action 
If event e brings about a state in which the enabling conditions of an effective action a are true, cf. [IS] 
1161 RBQB(RB((3 e)(3a)[want(Q,if3il Q,C)) & admissible(e(Sc)) 
& admisible(a(efSc) \ ) & holds(-.faii(Q,C),a(e(Sc)))]) 
==+ likely(in jorm-that(R,Q, 
f3 e)(3 a,) /h 01 ds (- j n i.1 (Q, C), a (~(SC)))) d
adnai~sibte(a(ejSc)j])),Sc)) 
then the same principles about informing Q of the likelihood or unlikelihood of e apply as they did before. 
In addition, R must inform Q of u, cf. [16]. Thus R's full response would be 'You can't drop 577. Ij e 
were to occur, which is (un)likely, you could a and thus not ja i l  577.' 
4. Reasoning 
Our intent in using logic has been to have a precise representation language whose syntax informs R's 
reasoning about Q's beliefs. Having computed a full response that conforms t.o all these expectations, R 
may go on to 'trim' it according to principles of brevity that we do not discuss here. 
Our proposal is that the informing behavior is *pre-compiled'. That is, R does not reason explicitly 
about Q's expectations, but rather has compiled the conditions into a case analysis similar t o  a 
discrimination net. For instance, we can represent informally several of the cases in section 3. 
lf adrniasible(drop(Q,Cj(Sc)) 
then lf 7holds(-4ail(Q,C),droy(Q,C#Sc)) 
then begin nsn reductive set 
v (3a)lad~+t holds(-.frii(Q,C).YSc))] 
then a way 
else no way 
end 
else if (3B)I3rdmissible(b(Sc)) & 
then a better wa 
else 11 (3 b ) [ a d ~ z ( & ) )  & holds(-faii(Q,C), ~(SC))] 
then a waz  
elre no way 
... 
Note that we are assuming that R assumes the most demanding expectations by Q. Therefore, R can 
reason solely within its own space without missing things. 
5. Conclusion 
Since the behavior of expert systems will be interpreted in terms of the behavior users expect of 
cooperative human experts, we (as system designers) must understand such behavior patterns so as to  
implement them in our systems. If such systems are to  be truly cooperative, it is not sufficient for them t o  
be simply truthful. Additionally, they must be able to predict lirnited classes of false inferences that users 
might draw from dialogue with them and a h  to respond in a way t o  prevent those false inferences. The 
current enterprise is a small but non-trivial step in this direction. In addition to  questions about achieving 
goals, we are investigating other cases where a cooperative expert should prevent false inferences by 
another agent, including preventing inappropriate default reasoning 16, JWWMnonmon]. 
Future work should include 
a identification of additional cases where an expert must prevent false inferences by another 
agent, 
e formal statement of a general principle for constaining the search for possible false inferences, 
and 
design of a natural language planning component to  carry out the informing acts assumed in 
this paper. 
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